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THE IMPACT OF BART ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

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The BART Impact Program is a comprehensive, policy-oriented study and evaluation of the impacts of the San Francisco Bay Area's new rapid transit system (BART).

The program is being conducted by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, a nine-county regional agency established by state law in 1970.

The program is financed by the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the California Department of Transportation. Management of the Federally funded portion of the program is vested in the U.S. Department of Transportation.

The BART Impact Program covers the entire range of potential rapid transit impacts, including impacts on traffic flow, travel behavior, land use and urban development, the environment, the regional economy, social institutions and life styles, and public policy. The incidence of these impacts on population groups, local areas, and economic sectors will be measured and analyzed. The benefits of BART, and their distribution, will be weighed against the negative impacts and costs of the system in an objective evaluation of the contribution that the rapid transit investment makes toward meeting the needs and objectives of this metropolitan area and all of its people.

BART IMPACT PROGRAM
PUBLIC POLICY PROJECT
THE IMPACT OF BART ON
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS



JUNE, 1977
WORKING PAPER
PREPARED FOR
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

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PREPARED BY BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC.

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SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

The organization of the BART District in 1957 resulted in the first truly regional rapid transit district in the Bay Area, as well as a new regional governmental agency. Despite the short history of BART, the structure and operations of the agency have changed dramatically in response to changing needs and demands.

The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of the BART District, and its changing organization and operating practices, on the formation of and changes in other governmental and community organizations in the Bay Area. Further, the effect of these organizations on BART was explored.

The overall conclusion of this study is that BART has had little or no impact on organization formation, structure and practices in local, regional or state governments or agencies. Further, these same organizations have had little or no impact on BART. Where BART and government organizations did interact, most BART-related issues were handled within existing organization structures or within generally accepted informal arrangements.

A number of reasons were advanced by key informants for the lack of any more significant BART organizational impacts. First, local governments in the Bay Area viewed BART as an issue, not an opportunity. Local officials generally responded to BART--such as concurring with BART plans, agreeing to BART construction schedules or developing BART-related traffic plans. Seldom did officials initiate specific local approaches to take advantage of BART. Second, organizational charters and bureaucratic structures in the Bay Area's larger cities have evolved over long periods of time and are difficult and costly to change. Third, in a region characterized by strong local government control, the formation of effective regional organizations would not be possible solely due to BART.

Other metropolitan areas with strong local government controls and the absence of a strong regional governing body can benefit from the organizational experience related to BART. Specifically:

- . Governmental officials should not expect the formation of a new regional transit district and resulting transit development to cause any change in the organizational structure, staffing, or operations of local, regional and state governments.
- . Local, regional and state agencies will probably not benefit by altering existing organizational arrangements in any significant way, just to respond to rapid rail transit development.

- . If regional governmental structures are generally fragmented, as in the Bay Area, rapid rail transit officials should plan on significant time delay and cost increases before system construction can begin.

These conclusions and implications about regional governmental organization are based on study of the relationship of BART to three government organizational issues.

- . Municipal incorporation
- . Local government and community organizations
- . Regional and state agencies

The following three sections briefly outline conclusions and implications for each of these issues.

(1) Municipal Incorporation

BART was, at most, an indirect cause for recent municipal incorporation attempts in the BART counties. The development of BART itself was not used as an issue for or against any incorporation attempts. Where BART was expected to cause substantial development and growth in an area, and local control over growth was an incorporation issue, then BART had some indirect effect on incorporation.

Based on the BART experience, other jurisdictions should not expect rapid transit development to cause incorporation. Nor should communities expect that incorporation alone would provide a better organizational structure for taking advantage of any proposed rapid transit development.

Hypothetically, incorporation would provide some benefits by increasing local control over certain rapid transit-related decisions such as station location, route alignment and supportive land use policy. Generally though, an incorporation would not be implemented early enough in a rapid rail planning process to allow these benefits to be realized.

(2) Local Government And Community Organizations

BART had little impact on the organizational structure or operating practices of local governments and community groups in the BART counties. The two larger cities (Oakland and San Francisco) did form special inter-departmental committees and appoint liaisons to work with

BART officials. However, none of these arrangements were permanent or differed dramatically from organizational arrangements used for any other large project. Smaller cities tended to use existing organizational channels to deal with BART.

Community and business groups were actively involved with BART, but, in few cases, changed their structures or formed new arrangements because of BART. The primary exception was the Market Street Development Project, a San Francisco non-profit group representing merchants and business leaders. The group was formed in 1962 specifically to take advantage of BART.

The BART experience suggests that rapid rail transit development is not likely to cause any noticeable changes in local government or community group organization and operations. Local governments, particularly in large cities with older bureaucratic structures, can take steps to ease the inevitable rapid transit coordination effort by forming a liaison position or staff or a form of inter-departmental committee. Smaller cities can generally rely on existing organizational channels and arrangements to deal with BART issues.

(3) Regional And State Agencies

BART did appear to have some impacts on regional and state agencies, but only on those agencies with a mandate for transportation planning within the region (the State of California Department of Transportation and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission). BART's impact was primarily accelerating the formation of an agency such as MTC to deal with regional transportation issues as well as hastening MTC's recent shift in emphasis from planning to transit operations performance evaluation and funding allocation.

Based on the BART experience, the development of a regional rapid rail transit system will probably only affect regional and state agencies with a transportation planning mission. Therefore, such an agency should either be formed, or, if it exists, consider staffing and organizing in anticipation of an important watchdog role in any rapid rail system development.

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a description of the BART Impact Program and the Public Policy Project and outlines the organization of this report on governmental organization and operations.

1. THE BART IMPACT PROGRAM

The BART Impact Program (BIP) is a comprehensive, policy-oriented study and evaluation of the impacts of the new San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. The BIP covers the entire range of potential rapid transit impacts, with six major projects covering impacts on traffic flow and travel behavior, land use and urban development, the environment, the regional economy, social institutions and life styles, and public policy. The incidence of these impacts on population groups, local areas, and economic sectors is being measured and analyzed.

2. THE PUBLIC POLICY PROJECT

The Public Policy Project can be viewed as a major integrating chapter in the overall BART Impact Program. Each BIP project measures and evaluates BART's impacts on a variety of social, economic, transportation and community factors. The Public Policy Project, in turn, measures the direct and indirect impact of BART on public policy and the policy-making process. The project also assesses how impacts evaluated in other projects result in changes in public policy and the policy-making process and how public policy changes further impact BART.

More specifically, the Public Policy Project includes an examination of:

- . The policy-making process and behavior that occurred locally (neighborhood, city-wide, region-wide) due to a given BART impact(s).
- . The public policy change or decision, if any, that resulted from this interaction between a BART impact or expected BART impact and the community, interest groups, public officials and the like.
- . The implications of these public policy impacts and all other BART impacts on local government policy decisions or lack of decisions.

This report specifically assesses the relationship between the planning for and development of BART and the organization and operations of local, regional and state governmental agencies and community groups, as well as the incorporation of new local governments in the Bay Area. Specific issues addressed in this analysis include:

- . Documentation of any relationship between BART and recent municipal incorporations in the Bay Area and the reasons for any impact or lack of impact.
- . Identification of any changes in local organization in response to BART and why or why not these changes occurred.
- . Review of recent regional and **state** agency formations and changes and their relationship, if any, to BART.

3. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

This Working Paper presents findings, conclusions and implications regarding the impact of BART on government organization and operations in three major areas. First, it assesses the relationship of BART with each of seven recent municipal incorporation attempts in the BART counties. Second, it analyzes BART's role in any changes in local government and community group organization and operations. Third, it assesses the role of BART in recent formations of regional and state agencies including their staffing and organizational structure.

II. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

The organization of the BART District resulted in a new regional governmental agency with an active policy board, staff and management and planning processes necessary for the development and operation of a rapid transit system. Despite the short history of BART, the structure and operations of the agency have changed dramatically in response to changing needs and demands. The objective of this study is to identify changes in governmental organization and operations which resulted from the formation of and various changes in BART.

1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY IS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF BART ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

For this analysis, three specific types of potential government organizational changes in response to BART were selected. Policy research questions were outlined for each area as follows:

- . Municipal Incorporation
 - Was BART an explicit cause for any of the recent incorporation attempts in the Bay Area?
 - Did BART-related expectations of growth and development have an effect on municipal incorporation decisions?
- . Local government and community group organization
 - Has the formation of BART caused the formation of new or strengthening of existing local governmental units or staff positions to deal with BART and its impacts?
 - Did BART cause any change in local government management or planning processes?
 - Did BART cause the formation and/or cohesion of any community (particularly minority) groups and did these groups have any effect on local decision-makers?

Organization of regional and state agencies

- Has BART's particular management and organization structure influenced the formation and/or alteration of regional and state agencies?

2. THE STUDY APPROACH EMPHASIZED KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS, SUPPLEMENTED BY DOCUMENT AND NEWSPAPER CLIPPING REVIEW

Key informant interviews were used as the primary source for documenting study findings for two reasons:

- . Organizational and process changes are generally informal and not well documented. Therefore, the memories and perceptions of organizational actors represented, in many cases, the only means for identifying relevant impacts.
- . The broad scope in terms of time period and number of cities and organizations obviated the need to rely heavily on key informants to identify potential organizational impacts and to use remaining study time only to verify the cause and outcomes of those potential impacts.

Once key informants identified potential impacts, various documents including meeting minutes and agendas, agency and local community group memoranda, correspondence and publications and newspaper clippings were reviewed to try to assess the cause for the organizational change and its effectiveness. Conclusions were drawn with confidence in relation to the quality and consistency of findings from interview and documentary sources.

3. THE NO-BART ALTERNATIVE WAS USED AS A POINT OF COMPARISON IN IDENTIFYING BART IMPACTS

The BART Impact Program has developed a No-BART Alternative (NBA), defined as the "most likely" transportation system for the Bay Area in the absence of BART. For purposes of this analysis, the NBA was equated with the organizational environment before BART. This way, changes in organizational structure were identified and, where possible, BART-related changes were isolated from changes in response to other policy issues.

4. PUBLIC POLICY LITERATURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY SUGGEST THAT ONLY LIMITED AND TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE SHOULD BE EXPECTED AS A RESULT OF BART

Government organizations, whether local, regional or state, can generally be characterized as bureaucratic structures. The literature on bureaucratic organizations and experience with different forms of governments suggest a number of characteristics which support the hypotheses suggesting little or no organizational change will result from BART.¹ These characteristics include:

- . Bureaucratic organizations are governed by rigid rules and procedures establishing their structure. For example, California city and county organizational structures are usually included in charters, ordinances or resolutions, therefore requiring legal changes and often voter approval to implement an organizational change. Legislative and executive officials, as well as the public, are reluctant to change this legal organizational base. San Francisco is a prime example where charter reform has been attempted and has failed on many occasions.
- . Staff relationships are characterized by strict hierarchical structures and lines of authority. Employees are taught to be expert in a narrow area of specialty and never overstep established chains of command. This tendency leads to narrowly defined, independent organizational units, often lacking a central unifying force.
- . Many government staffing decisions are controlled by rigid civil service systems or collective bargaining agreements. In many cases, the creation of a new staff position can require from six months to two years and filling the position with the right incumbent can take even longer.
- . When a new program or agency is created that affects more than one city department, bureaucracies often react by a "management by committee" approach to decision-making. Decision-makers benefit from the lack of individual accountability, but implementation often falls through the cracks.

¹ See, for example, Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organization or Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964).

- . Due to the generally rigid structure, bureaucracies tend to react to change by adding staff within existing units rather than creating new organization units.
- . Bureaucracies tend to react to issues and problems rather than to view policy as an opportunity to meet overall policy objectives.

Alternatively, community groups, by virtue of their smaller size and often temporary character, are not generally constrained by the intransigence of the bureaucratic organization. The Bay Area, in particular San Francisco, is known for the continual establishment of temporary, issue-oriented groups in response to governmental decisions impacting individual neighborhoods. BART, as a tangible issue with significant projected neighborhood impacts, is likely to cause some community organizing activity.

Private organizations also have a long record of involvement in public decisions with some economic or land use impacts. However, business organizations were well established and often bureaucratic and BART would likely generate an organizational response but probably not an organizational change.

5. THE BAY AREA IS CHARACTERIZED BY STRONG, OFTEN WELL-ESTABLISHED LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

A brief description of the regional organizational arrangements during the BART development period provides a setting for assessing the impacts of BART on various types of organizations.

The BART District was established in 1957 as the first truly regional transit district in the Bay Area. During much of BART's development, governmental authority was almost entirely in the hands of individual local jurisdictions. A number of regional agencies were formed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in response to specific regional issues (e.g. transportation, land use planning, air pollution). Few of these agencies had any real governing authority as it might relate to BART planning until the last two or three years. Likewise state agencies have not played a strong or active role in BART-related issues during the BART development period.

III. THE IMPACT OF BART ON MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION

Substantial growth in many Bay Area communities has resulted in a number of municipal incorporations since 1950. These incorporations occurred during the initial planning stages of the BART system and during a period of continual change in BART District organization and operation. The purpose of this chapter is to assess what role, if any, BART land use and system planning and expectations played in recent municipal incorporation decisions.

A brief introduction to the legal requirements for municipal incorporation provides a foundation for assessing the impacts of BART on this process. Pursuant to the Knox-Nisbet Act of 1963, and subsequently by later legislative acts, each county is required to establish a Local Agency Formation Commission or LAFCo. Each LAFCo. has the power "to review and approve or disapprove, with or without amendment, wholly, particularly or conditionally, proposals for city incorporation, special district formation, city annexation and detachment, city disincorporation, city consolidation and the development of new communities."² Before any measure for incorporation, annexation or consolidation may be taken to the voters, it must have the approval of the LAFCo.

1. BACKGROUND ON RECENT INCORPORATION ATTEMPTS IN THE BAY AREA

As a basis for assessing BART's impact on municipal incorporation, BART county incorporation attempts since 1962 were researched. The only successful incorporations during the period occurred in Contra Costa County:

- . Pleasant Hill--incorporated November, 1961 (has BART station).
- . Clayton--incorporated March, 1964.
- . Lafayette--incorporated July, 1968 (has BART station).
- . Moraga--incorporated November, 1974.

In addition to these four successful incorporations, numerous local Contra Costa County communities have attempted incorporation. Few of these proposed incorporations have gone to public vote. Three of the most recent attempts that did not succeed were:

- . Orinda--attempted 1974 (has BART station).
- . San Ramon Valley--attempted 1975.
- . Muir--attempted 1975.

²Section 54773 et seq. of the State of California Government Code.

The following sections present brief descriptions of each incorporation attempt and the reasons for success or failure of the proposal.

(1) Pleasant Hill--Incorporated November, 1961

Pleasant Hill is located in Central Contra Costa County and abuts the communities of Walnut Creek, Concord, Martinez and Lafayette, as well as substantial unincorporated areas. One BART station is located on the unincorporated fringe of Pleasant Hill, although residents also have relatively easy access to the BART stations in Lafayette and Walnut Creek. Prior to World War II, Pleasant Hill was primarily an agricultural area. However, during the period 1950 to 1960, Pleasant Hill experienced rapid growth in new housing developments. The already incorporated communities of Walnut Creek and Concord were also growing at a rapid rate and undertook a policy of aggressive annexation of neighboring areas, including major segments of the Pleasant Hill area.

Major reasons behind the incorporation of Pleasant Hill included:

- . Incorporation rather than annexation would preserve the identity of the community.
- . Incorporation provided for more effective control of government and land use decisions.
- . Incorporation would provide the local community with improved police services.

No doubt a major factor in the successful incorporation was the fact that the proposed city government could operate without the levy of a property tax. To this date, the City of Pleasant Hill has been able to fund its operations without levying a property tax.

(2) Clayton--Incorporated March, 1964

The City of Clayton is located in eastern Contra Costa County and is almost totally surrounded by the City of Concord. The nearest BART station is located in Concord and is within access to the residents of Clayton. The primary reason for incorporation was a defensive move to prevent annexation to the City of Concord and to maintain the identity of the small community of Clayton.

(3) Lafayette--Incorporated July, 1968

The City of Lafayette is located in central Contra Costa County and abuts the cities of Walnut Creek, Pleasant Hill and Moraga, the unincorporated community of Orinda, as well as substantial other unincorporated areas of the County. One BART station is located in the median of Highway 24 within the city limits of Lafayette. Residents of Lafayette have easy access to this station and other stations along the Highway 24 corridor.

The possibility of incorporating the community of Lafayette was proposed at various times prior to the actual incorporation in 1968. The principal reason behind the success of the 1968 incorporation was to gain local community control of zoning, land use and development decisions, then in the hands of the County Planning Commission. The County LAFCo. gave initial support to the annexation of the Lafayette area by the City of Walnut Creek. This measure met with little support in Lafayette, where local community identity was very strong. As in the case of Pleasant Hill, the successful incorporation of Lafayette was undoubtedly enhanced by the fact that a property tax levy would not be required to fund the proposed local government.

(4) Moraga--Incorporated November, 1974

The newly formed City of Moraga is located in the west central Contra Costa County and abuts the City of Lafayette and the unincorporated community of Orinda, as well as substantial unincorporated areas of the County. The residents of Moraga have relatively easy access to the Orinda and Lafayette stations along the median of Highway 24. Moraga is a community that traces its beginnings back to a Mexican land grant to Joaquin Moraga (of approximately 13,000 acres of land). Moraga remained primarily a ranching and farming community until the late 1950's when the residential population began to grow rapidly.

Reasons for the incorporation of Moraga include:

- . Enhanced communications between citizens and local government and increased political effectiveness.
- . Strong community identity.
- . Desire for local government control of land use and development decisions.

The decision in 1974 by the Contra Costa County LAFCo. to designate Moraga within the sphere of influence of the City of Lafayette was also an important motivating factor for incorporation at that time.

(5) Orinda--Incorporation Failed

Incorporation has long been studied in the community of Orinda. A loose-knit community organization called the Orinda Association had been in existence since World War II and carries the burden of local battles at the county level. A 1956 study for incorporation listed seven advantages, ranging from controlling local planning and maintaining community identity, to improving the provision of local governmental services. The same reasons for incorporation have been repeated in subsequent studies with a different ranking in the order of importance. Incorporation has failed in Orinda for a number of reasons, including a need to increase taxes to provide for projected city service levels and the citizens' desire to maintain a rural atmosphere without the embellishments of city life.

(6) Muir--Incorporation Failed

The proposed City of Muir is located in eastern Contra Costa County, abutting the communities of Martinez, Pleasant Hill, Concord and Pittsburg and the San Pablo Bay. Incorporation was originally proposed as a defensive measure. The area proposed for the City of Muir, under the LAFCo.'s designated spheres of influence, was to be divided between the cities of Martinez, Pleasant Hill, Concord and Pittsburg. The proposed incorporation of Muir was denied by the LAFCo. This decision was appealed to the courts by the proponents for incorporation, where the LAFCo. decision was upheld.

(7) San Ramon Valley--Incorporation Failed

The proposed incorporation of the San Ramon Valley would have included within its boundaries the unincorporated communities of Alamo, Danville, Diablo, Round Hill and San Ramon. In the period since the 1970 census, San Ramon Valley communities experienced the highest growth rate in Contra Costa County. This rate of growth was projected to continue for the foreseeable future.

These communities proposed incorporation for two primary reasons:

- . A desire for local community control over service provision and land use decisions.
- . Concern with projected growth in the area and perceived lack of responsiveness of the County Planning Commission.

The proposed incorporation of the community of San Ramon Valley was approved by the LAFCo. and presented to the voters of the proposed community in November of 1975. It was defeated in a narrow election. Observers have advanced two primary reasons for the defeat of the proposal:

- . Most voters had a strong identity with their individual community, but not with the combination community proposed for incorporation.
- . Opponents argued that the operation of the proposed city would result in a significant increase in property tax levies.

2. THE IMPACT OF BART ON MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION

BART appears to have had no direct impact on any of seven recent municipal incorporation decisions researched in this study. No specific evidence was found to support the lack of impact. However, an exhaustive search of a wide variety of materials was conducted without uncovering any relationship of these incorporation attempts to BART. For example:

- . Major alternative studies were conducted for each incorporation attempt. No mention of the relationship to BART was included in any of the studies of the seven incorporation attempts.
- . A substantial portion of the testimony at public hearings before the LAFCo. was reviewed for two of the incorporation attempts. BART was not mentioned in either case.
- . Campaign literature, both pro and con, was reviewed for two incorporation attempts. BART was never mentioned in any of this material.

- . A selected sample of leading proponents for two incorporations and the LAFCo. Executive Director were interviewed and none of them viewed BART as a factor in the incorporation attempt.

Therefore, the lack of any apparent direct relationship between BART and incorporation attempts after an exhaustive search leads to the conclusion that BART was not a direct cause for incorporation.

Each incorporation attempt reviewed in this analysis was initiated in response to a particular community issue. Important community issues were different in each area studied, although issues generally related to the following themes:

- . Local identity
- . Growth
- . Planning and land use control

In no case was BART mentioned as an issue in a community where an incorporation attempt was under way.

A comparison of ingredients behind successful incorporation attempts and the causes of failed attempts also suggests that BART was not a factor. Communities along the BART Concord Line represent both successful and failed incorporation attempts. The level of community identity and potential costs of incorporation were generally the most important factors in the success or failure of a particular issue, not the existence of a public works project such as BART.

Despite the lack of any apparent direct relationship between BART and incorporation attempts, further analysis suggests that an indirect relationship may be present, although not acknowledged by any key informants interviewed. Particularly in the rapidly growing Contra Costa County suburban communities, BART was expected to have a substantial impact on the growth and development of these communities. No evidence thus far suggests these expectations have been met. However, if local officials believed the apparently exaggerated expectations of growth, some interest in incorporating as a means to control this growth could have been considered. At best, this potential impact of BART on municipal incorporations is indirect and small.

IV. THE IMPACT OF BART ON THE ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS

This chapter assesses the impact of the new BART District organization and its planning and management processes on changes in the organization and operation of local governments and community groups in the BART counties.

The BIP programwide case study areas were used as a framework for identifying organizational changes and determining their relationship to BART. The case study cities provide examples of two different types of local government structure:

- . Weak Mayor-Chief Administrative Officer (San Francisco).
- . Council/Manager (all others).

Charts and brief descriptions of the organizational structure of each of the case study cities are included as Appendix A.

The type and form of city government can be expected to be one variable in how a city responds to a major project like BART. A more complex and fragmented bureaucracy like San Francisco can be expected to respond to BART more slowly, less efficiently and with more need for organizational change than a smaller, more centralized city government such as Walnut Creek or Fremont.

The following three sections present BART's organizational impacts related to the basic study research questions outlined in Chapter II and summarized below:

- . The formation of new or strengthening of existing local government units or staff positions to deal with BART and its impacts.
- . Changes in local government management or planning processes as a result of BART.
- . Formation and/or cohesion of any community (particularly minority) groups and their effect on local decisions related to BART.

1. BART'S IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

The planning and design of the BART system required continual interaction of BART officials and their contractors with local government officials in communities which would be impacted by BART. Further, legal agreements had to be negotiated between BART and each local government for the use of public rights-of-way by BART.

This section assesses how local governments in the BART counties responded to BART's construction and later operating requirements.

(1) An Inter-Departmental Committee Was The Type Of Organization Structure Created By Large Cities To Deal With BART And BART-Related Issues

The two cities containing large CBD areas within the BART District (Oakland and San Francisco) both developed an inter-departmental committee structure as a vehicle for coordinating responses to and providing interaction with BART. These two committee structures had the following characteristics:

- . In both cases, a policy committee including heads of various departments was established to approve BART plans and recommend appropriate city actions related to BART.
- . Both policy committees had staff: in Oakland a single staff member in the Department of Public Works and in San Francisco as many as 15 staff members on the Transit Task Force. Staff members served as day-to-day project managers and liaisons with BART and Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Tudor and Bechtel (PBTB), BART's contractor.
- . Both committees concentrated on engineering and public works issues: near term operations rather than long term planning. This is primarily because they were only functional during the construction period and were disbanded soon afterward. Although Planning Directors were members of the policy committees, they appeared to have less influence than the engineers.

- . In both cities, these organizations were temporary and were disbanded at the conclusion of the construction period. With the need for BART/city interaction substantially reduced as operations began, responses could be easily handled within existing decision-making channels.

Although these organizations were formed solely because of BART, the type of organization formed was not new. In both cities, the use of inter-departmental committees is a standard procedure for dealing with major policy issues which cut across departmental boundaries. This arrangement has evolved for a number of reasons:

- . An inter-departmental committee provides a temporary structure for bringing the appropriate resources together to deal with a particular issue. Membership can be selected and changed in response to the issue. Membership can also be self-selecting because meeting attendance records generally reflect the interest and stake of any single public administrator and department. This type of group can be simply disbanded when its usefulness ends.
- . The inter-departmental committee provides a flexible element within a usually rigid local government structure. Implementing organization change in California cities, particularly San Francisco, is difficult due to strict city charter and civil service regulations. The formation of an inter-departmental committee requires no formal organizational changes and does not produce the resulting problems, but does provide a vehicle for staff groups from different departments to interact on particular issues.
- . An inter-departmental committee provides a safe course for public officials. The function of a committee is to make recommendations, not take action.

Although inter-departmental committees do provide some advantages in dealing with a complex issue such as BART, such an arrangement did not guarantee an effective decision-making process for BART-related issues. For example, San Francisco limited BART's access to city officials strictly

to the Project Manager of the Transit Task Force (the staff to the inter-departmental policy committee). Oakland used a more flexible approach, allowing BART to contact individual departments for specific information. Although the San Francisco alternative allowed better coordination in a single location, it was also more bureaucratic and was not always responsive within BART system deadlines. BART officials felt that the informal arrangement in Oakland allowed them to get more effective and timely decisions on issues than the formal arrangement in San Francisco.

(2) Smaller Cities Generally Responded To BART Within Existing Organization Structures And Channels

Small cities (such as Richmond, Fremont and Walnut Creek) with a single BART station and expecting limited impacts, responded to BART through existing organizational channels without identifying a specific need for new structures and arrangements. Decision-makers in each city listed reasons for the lack of any BART-related organizational change as follows:

- . Outlying cities such as Walnut Creek and Fremont are in newly, yet rapidly developing areas. Formal governmental structures were fairly new when BART planning was first undertaken. Formal organization structures were and are few in number and clearly delineated. Lines of authority and communication appear clear and straightforward. In this type of decision environment, BART-related decisions were generally made efficiently without great time delays and need for any new or altered organizations.
- . The number of stations and type of construction appeared to have the most impact on the amount of interaction required between BART and local governments. Smaller suburban cities usually had only a single station and and at-grade or aerial construction, a combination which required a significantly lower level of interaction between local officials and BART than in a city such as San Francisco with eight stations and considerable subway construction.

In all, local officials in small cities treated BART-related issues, when they occurred, in the same manner and within the same organizational structures as they treated city issues or decisions related to any other regional or state agency.

(3) Some Local Governments Created Special Staff Liaison Positions To Facilitate Coordination With BART

Key informants in each case study city listed BART as a factor in at least one addition in staff or creation of a new position. Examples of the types of positions added and their relationship to BART include:

- . Public Works--San Francisco, Oakland and Richmond all created positions within the Public Works Department to provide a day-to-day liaison with BART. In San Francisco, the position was titled Project Manager-Transit Task Force, but a former Public Works Department staff member filled that position and administratively reported to the Public Works Director.

Such a position was clearly a necessity in both Oakland and San Francisco, where BART issues were raised and required decisions on a daily basis. Examples of such issues were street closings, traffic control, sidewalk width, utility placement and many more. The issues, although small, generally required some city action or response before BART could legally proceed. Any delay in resolution would usually further delay BART construction. The need for a full-time liaison position was not as compelling in Richmond, which did not face the continuing and substantial disruption due to subway and multiple station construction as did Oakland and San Francisco.

- . Transportation Planner--Walnut Creek was the only case study city to establish the position of Transportation Planner during the study period (in this case 1972). The larger cities of San Francisco and Oakland had already established some form of transportation planning. The two remaining cities, Fremont and Richmond, have not yet identified the need for such a capacity. In the Walnut Creek situation, key informants concede that the position was not created in response to BART, but rather a long desired need by the city to supplement its Downtown Master Plan with a Transportation Element incorporating all modes of transportation. Although the

establishment of the planner was not a direct result of BART, he became active in coordination with BART, particularly related to providing feeder service to BART via the local shuttle bus system. Now that the Transportation Element of the General Plan has been completed, the position has been re-classified to Traffic Engineer.

- . Traffic Engineer--Fremont created the position of Traffic Engineer to conduct circulation planning and analysis in the downtown Fremont area. Although the current Traffic Engineer feels that BART was one factor in the establishment of the position, the substantial growth in population and correspondingly in traffic would have provided sufficient justification without BART. Other case study cities have traffic engineering functions which have been a long-standing and established part of the city organization structure. This function had some interaction with or provided support services for BART, but no specific organizational changes or staffing increases resulted.

In all these cases, the positions that were created generally responded to BART's construction impacts. As the construction phase ended and operations began, most positions were either eliminated or folded into existing organizations. Where a position was maintained, as in the case of the Walnut Creek Transportation Planner, the position served an important purpose without BART and would have been created in any case.

- (4) BART Construction Caused Some Increase In City Government Workload, But No Apparent Changes In The Structure Of Existing City Agencies Or Departments

Change in existing city organization structure is a common practice in response to changes in management, workload and objectives. In no case study cities did BART result in a change in objectives or focus of a particular agency or department sufficient to result in some change in the organization's structure. As stated earlier, BART had little visible effect on operations in small cities. In large cities, BART responses were dealt with by separate new committees and rarely required significant input from other city departments.

Key informants did indicate, however, that BART had some secondary impact on the workload in some city departments. Examples cited include:

- . Planning departments initiated a number of special studies of BART station areas or development issues related in some way to BART. These studies were generally conducted by consultants, but city staff was needed to monitor study progress and results.
- . Traffic engineering sections were often asked to conduct special circulation studies or draw up plans to accommodate changes in traffic patterns required by BART construction.
- . Engineering and Building Inspection staff workloads were increased to respond to partially BART-related development interests (only observed in Walnut Creek).

Although most key informants claimed that BART did result in increased city workloads, in no case could key informants cite an example of any special requisition for additional staff in existing organizations due to BART-related increases in workload. Legislative officials interviewed were also unable to recall any occasion where BART was used as an explicit reason for any requests for staff increases. Officials generally felt that BART-related work was a small percentage of the total workload in most departments and was completed as time permitted.

2. BART'S IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

Although BART has had some minor impacts on organizational structure and staffing of local governments, BART appears to have had almost no effect on planning and management processes or other operations of local governments in the BART counties.

As described earlier, the smaller case study cities (Richmond, Walnut Creek, Fremont) dealt with BART issues almost exclusively through existing city decision-making processes using well established procedures. City decision-makers interviewed saw no need to change any existing or develop new procedures just to resolve BART

issues. Further, BART-related decisions were a relatively small and short term portion of the cities' agendas.

In the two larger case study cities (San Francisco and Oakland) some management processes were altered to deal with BART-related issues. However, any changes in process did not set any new precedents. Any new practices were similar to those used before to deal with large issues that cross existing organizational boundaries.

For example, inter-departmental committees were used by both San Francisco and Oakland as a mechanism for making BART-related decisions. The intent was to encourage department head interaction on BART-related issues, hopefully speeding their resolution. In assessing the effectiveness of this type of arrangement, it is clear that the use of an inter-departmental committee alone did not guarantee effective and timely BART-related decisions. A comparison of the results in Oakland and San Francisco suggest the success of such an arrangement depends on cooperation, availability of professional staff and chief executive commitment.

Overall, BART had little impact on planning processes in the case study areas. The only two evident changes related to planning for urban residential areas of Oakland and San Francisco. The BART-related activity of community groups in the Rockridge neighborhood in Oakland and the Mission District in San Francisco resulted in some change in emphasis and approach in the local planning process. The change was most pronounced in Oakland where the substantial influence of the Rockridge Community Planning Council (RCPC) on the decision to downzone in the BART station area led to RCPC's continuing involvement in the local planning process. RCPC Design Review Committee now plays a review function on all City Planning Commission proposals involving the Rockridge neighborhood. In San Francisco, Mission District community groups had already played an active role in the local planning process. Neighborhood concern about BART and projected development did lead the Mission Planning Council to request and receive special studies of development impacts of BART in the Mission District. This reinforced a precedent of the City Planning Department conducting special studies for community organizations when the need arises.

3. BART'S IMPACT ON COMMUNITY GROUPS

BART had some, although generally minor, impacts on community groups in the BART counties. Three different types of community groups (representing business, merchants and neighborhoods) each had significantly different expectations of BART. In each case, these expectations dictated how the groups responded to BART.

(1) Business Leaders Generally Organized To Promote And Take Advantage Of BART

Business leaders, particularly in San Francisco and Oakland, were the original promoters and developers of the rapid transit concept as a means to improve access and reduce congestion in the Bay Area. These leaders generally represented large national or multi-national corporations, with headquarters or major facilities in the Bay Area, and with strong ties to the Bay Area and its future. These leaders clearly viewed BART as an opportunity and were involved not only in fund-raising and selling the original system to the voters, but analyzing system alternatives and suggesting other amenities to take advantage of BART (such as street improvements).

In each case study city, business leaders through their Chambers of Commerce or independently, formed special committees to review BART-related issues during the early stages of BART planning and development. In each city, input from business leaders was considered an important factor in reaching city or BART decisions.

Some examples of the impact on business groups include:

- . The San Francisco business community had been active in support and planning for BART, since its inception in the late 1940's, as a loosely-structured group of San Francisco business executives. The group was committed to BART and raised \$220,000 to support the BART bond issue campaign.
- . Walnut Creek's business community was concerned with the preservation of the downtown core area while encouraging development. Business leaders clearly viewed BART, and more significantly freeway access, as opportunities for Walnut Creek. They enthusiastically supported programs such as the shuttle service to improve access from BART to downtown.

Once initial system planning was complete and the BART bond issue approved, these same groups largely ceased any active role related to BART. These groups expressed little continuing interest in detailed system designs or future operations.

(2) Merchants And Local Property Owners Were More Cautious About BART's Potential And Generally Formed Groups To Protect Themselves From BART's Adverse Impacts

Merchants and property owners, particularly in the two large CBD areas (San Francisco and Oakland) were more pessimistic about BART's value than business leaders. They were primarily concerned about BART construction and its effect on their businesses; a strictly short-term perspective rather than the long-term view held by most business leaders. These merchants in San Francisco and Oakland organized temporary groups as a vehicle to protect themselves from construction impacts and only secondarily to try to gain some benefits from BART.

The Market Street Development Project (MSDP) appears to be the single exception to this attitude among merchant groups. The project was organized in December 1962 to "assure full benefit from the coming of rapid transit... ensure consideration of Market Street interests in all public and private planning...encourage and foster public and private cooperation and coordination in the development of our Street's tremendous potential", as described in MSDP brochures. One of the factors contributing to the success of MSDP was its flexibility in meeting BART's continually changing demands. The impact of BART subway construction, and later construction of the Embarcadero Station and Market Street beautification were sufficiently compelling issues to ensure early group cohesion. Now that major construction is complete, MSDP is still an active force to improve the image of Market Street through better police protection and street maintenance.

(3) Grass Roots Community Organizations Were Formed Or Responded to BART To Oppose What Were Currently Perceived As BART's Expected Adverse Impacts On Neighborhoods

In both Rockridge and the Mission District, BART was expected to cause a significant increase in development. These neighborhoods either organized, as in the case of Rockridge, or, as in both cases, used BART as a rallying point to oppose major new development through changes in local zoning policy. Both communities met their objectives. of stopping intensive development, although generally for quite different reasons. However, certain common characteristics of the organizing approaches contributed to their successes:

- . Each organization focused on a single issue and used BART as a tangible rallying point. Neither group has been quite as successful when organizing against other less tangible issues.
- . Community leaders worked closely with city officials, presenting viable, well researched alternatives to the city's plans.

In addition to grass roots organizations, the city governments in San Francisco, Fremont and Walnut Creek all formed citizens advisory committees at some point in the BART process. These committees generally included merchants and property owners representing various groups and constituencies. Committee meetings provided an opportunity to gain citizen input on specific BART-related issues, but more often allowed the interaction of various community viewpoints to gain a better consensus on important BART-related issues.

V. THE IMPACT OF BART ON REGIONAL AND STATE AGENCIES

During the 1960's, BART was the first of several organizational responses to regional problems that extended beyond the boundary of any one city or county and affected the long-term growth and development of the San Francisco Bay region as a whole. As a regional entity, BART represented a major new approach to governance and transportation in the Bay Area. This chapter assesses to what extent BART acted as an influence in shaping later responses to regional issues; or to what extent BART and other regional agencies simply followed similar patterns of organizational responses to regional problems.

To determine if BART was in any way influential in the organization of other regional agencies, or simply came into being during the same period, the project team examined the origins and evolution of three regional and State (of California) agencies which were formed during the period of BART planning and construction. These agencies are:

- . Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)
- . California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS)
- . Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC)

Overall, BART appeared to have no direct relationship to the formation or organizational structure of the three agencies examined. However, the continuing high level of interaction between BART and these agencies was a cause for a number of indirect impacts on the programming and direction of these agencies.

The following three sections present findings about each agency including the reasons for the creation of the agency as well as the relationship of the agency to BART and the BART District organization.

1. BAY AREA CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (BCDC)

The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) represents a State response to a highly successful and active public campaign to "Save the San Francisco Bay." The McAteer-Petris Act set up an interim commission and staff in 1965 with the purpose of:

- . Developing a plan for the conservation and development of the Bay.

- . Regulating development activities in and near the Bay while the plan was being developed.
- . Developing recommendations on the establishment of a permanent agency.

In 1968, a preliminary draft on the "San Francisco Bay Plan" was submitted to the State legislature. After approving the plan, the legislature passed the McAteer-Petris Act establishing BCDC as a permanent State agency.

(1) BCDC Is Organized To Fulfill Its Mission Of Updating The San Francisco Bay Plan And Approving All Proposed Development Near Or In The Bay


The legislation establishing BCDC as a permanent agency specifies that the BCD Commission will be governed by 27 members, made up of appointed representatives of State, regional, and local agencies. Exhibit I presents an organization chart, depicting BCDC as it was originally organized in 1965-69 compared with how it is organized today.

As shown in Exhibit I, the BCDC organization remains essentially concerned with updating the "San Francisco Bay Plan" and issuing permits for development within 100 feet of the Bay. In the early 1970's, several important staff additions were made to enhance BCDC's ability to deal with structural, design, and environmental aspects of proposed development projects, namely the appointment of:

- . A Citizens' Advisory Committee to advise the Commission generally on permit and planning activities.
- . An Engineering Criteria Review Board to advise the Commission on the safety of proposed fill projects.
- . A Design Review Board to advise the Commission on the design, appearance, and public access of proposed Bay and shoreline projects.
- . A staff engineer, a coastal zone analyst, and a design analyst.


EXHIBIT I
Public Policy Project
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF
BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
1965-69 and Present

BCDC As An Interim Agency, 1965-69



DURING THIS PERIOD, BCDC HAD 6 PROFESSIONALS AND 1000 STUDENTS. ALL STAFF MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS AND PART-TIME PLANNING STUDENTS WERE USED EXTENSIVELY.

BCDC As A Permanent Agency, 1969-77



THERE ARE CURRENTLY 12 PROFESSIONALS AND 7 CLERICAL STAFF MEMBERS

(2) Transportation Was A Major Issue Underlying The Creation Of BCDC

The extensive fill for freeway purposes along the Bay and plans for additional bridge crossings to serve automobile traffic were both partially responsible for public concern over the future of the Bay. The "San Francisco Bay Plan," approved in 1968, presented both findings and policy recommendations pertaining to transportation on and around the Bay. The most significant transportation policy as it relates to the Public Policy Project is the recommendation that there be a regional transportation agency, preferably one part of a "limited regional government," to explore and introduce new methods of transportation within the Bay Area. The transportation policy states further that the design of any future highway facilities "should anticipate future mass transit facilities (unless they are adequately paralleled by such facilities) and subsequent installation of automatic power and guidance elements for 'vehicles.'"³

(3) BCDC Represented A Regional Response To A Highly Visible Regional Public Problem And Was Not A Direct Or Indirect Result Of BART

BART and BCDC followed a similar pattern of being a regional response to a regional public problem. The material reviewed and the key informants interviewed did not support any direct impact of BART on the formation of BCDC.

BCDC and BART have very compatible regional transportation objectives as evidenced by the San Francisco Bay Plan policies advocating that Bay crossings include provision for fixed guideway transit systems. In addition, planning of airports and seaports in and around the Bay has become a major focus of BCDC planning coordination efforts with MTC. Finally, the coordination of Bay transportation policies is provided for by the BCDC chairman serving as a member of MTC.

Besides sharing supportive, compatible perspectives on Bay Area transportation facilities, BCDC acted to approve three permits related to BART's transbay crossing. The approval of these permits, however, was not in itself instrumental in the formation or organizational structure of BCDC.

³ San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, San Francisco Bay Plan, 1969.

2. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CALTRANS)

In 1973, the California State Legislature created a Department of Transportation as one of ten departments within the cabinet-level Business and Transportation Agency. This section describes the organization structure and history of CALTRANS and presents conclusions about the influence of BART in the transition of CALTRANS from a highway agency to a multi-modal transportation agency.

(1) The CALTRANS Organization Structure Reflects The Heavy State Emphasis On Highways

As depicted on Exhibit II, the CALTRANS central office organization structure consists of the following four groups:


- . Planning and Programming--formed in December, 1976, to deal with both transportation and multi-modal planning, funding and operations issues.
- . Engineering and Operations--responsible for all construction and maintenance activities.
- . Administration and Legal Affairs.
- . Financial Management.

The 11 district offices are under the direction of the Engineering and Operations group. These district offices, by virtue of their total field responsibility for highway projects throughout the district, have traditionally been relatively autonomous. The district offices are organized to carry out a full range of planning, engineering, and construction management and maintenance functions. Exhibit III shows the San Francisco District Office structure.


CALTRANS in total represents a massive State enterprise with 14,000 employees and an annual operating budget of more than \$1 billion as of 1976. Roughly 95% of this budget is for the highway program, with the balance distributed among mass transportation, aeronautics, planning and general support.

Policy direction for the department comes from the Highway Commission and the State Transportation Board. The State Aeronautics Board and the California Toll Bridge Authority also play some role in policy formulation.

EXHIBIT 11
Public Policy Project
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
CENTRAL OFFICE ORGANIZATION



Public Policy Project
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DISTRICT IV OFFICE ORGANIZATION



CALTRANS has yet to emerge as a true multi-modal transportation agency. The vague mandate given by AB 69 to the Mass Transportation Division has left this division without clear direction as to what its authority and role should be within CALTRANS vis-a-vis mass transportation throughout the State. The major responsibilities now assumed by this division are to:

- . Administer contracts with Amtrak to provide limited passenger service.
- . Allocate Transportation Development Act (TDA) funds in rural areas (authority in metropolitan areas delegated to regional planning organizations).
- . Adjudicate any disputes between regional agencies and transit operators and local jurisdictions concerning local distribution of TDA funds.
- . Administer Federal aid programs related to mass transit.
- . Undertake and supervise technical studies.

More recently, with the passage of SB 580, the Mass Transportation Division has been given responsibility to evaluate the adequacy and completeness of transportation extension plans of local agencies receiving Federal or State funds. Guidelines and regulations for carrying out this legislation are still in the process of development.

(2) The Nature Of The San Francisco District Office Activities Has Shifted Somewhat From Route Location To Facilities Maintenance And Regional Transportation

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was a marked decline in planning and building new freeways which was unrelated to BART. As a result, the District Office organization has changed slightly. For example, route location, a separate section during the BART construction era, declined in importance to the point where its remaining staff and functions were merged with the Design Section of the Project Development Division. Concurrently, the "urban planning" and "traffic planning" aspects grew in importance and were merged in 1973 to develop the District IV CALTRANS input to the transportation planning process mandated by AB 69.

An important and relatively recent factor affecting District IV activities has been the emergence of MTC as a developer and monitor of regional transportation projects. Virtually all District IV projects require the prior approval of MTC, which assembles all proposed transportation projects in the Transportation Improvement Program. The extensive nature of the MTC/District IV interaction results in close staff liaisons between MTC and CALTRANS at all levels.

(3) BART Had Some Impact On CALTRANS District IV Staff Workload And Operating Practices, But Not On The Original Formation Of The Agency

BART caused an increase in District IV staff workload, although no changes in staff size or organizational structure resulted. During the BART construction period, the extensive number of agreements related to the placement of BART in the freeway median (Highway 24) created a significant increase in the District Office workload. This increased workload, however, represented only four of the 200 to 300 agreements handled annually by the District and was handled within existing staffing and organizational arrangements.

Serious BART construction problems were partially responsible for legislation that will affect CALTRANS operating practices. The passage of SB 580, noted earlier as requiring CALTRANS' review of local facility expansion plans eligible for Federal and State funds, was in part attributable to the BART experience. Legislative concern over the possibility of further cost overruns and construction problems appears to have been one of several significant factors in the passage of SB 580. How this legislation will be implemented is yet unclear; nonetheless, it does offer the prospect of a substantive role for CALTRANS in local mass transportation planning and development.

Alternatively, the formation and organization of CALTRANS was inspired by Federal policy trends rather than any impact attributable to BART. In the minds of the key informants interviewed, shifts in Federal policy toward multi-modal transportation support caused the establishment of CALTRANS as a multi-modal transportation agency. The lack of a specific AB 69 mandate for CALTRANS vis-a-vis mass transit tends to support the conclusion that the Legislature was responding to something other than specific BART-related problems.

However, key informants interviewed conceded that it was quite likely that BART may have been influential in shaping recent changes in Federal transportation policy. To the extent this hypothesis can be supported, BART indeed could be considered an indirect influence on the formation and current organization structure of CALTRANS. BART's impact on Federal policy is, however, the subject of another impact project.

Finally, as noted earlier, the existence of MTC as the regional transportation planning agency has had a significant impact on the nature of District IV activities and planning responsibilities. Without MTC, District IV staff would, in all likelihood, need to assume the major responsibility for coordinating the development and implementation of regional transportation plans. Thus, to the extent the BART experience accelerated and shaped the development of MTC as the only statutorily established regional transportation planning agency in California, BART could be considered as having had a significant, albeit indirect, impact on the formation of CALTRANS and the regional role of the San Francisco District Office.

3. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION (MTC)

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) is the regional transportation planning agency responsible for coordinating transportation planning and funding among jurisdictions in the Bay Area. This section presents background information on the formation and functioning of MTC and ends with conclusions relating to BART's impact on MTC.

(1) The Formation Of MTC Was In Direct Response To A Need Identified By The Bay Area Study Commission Report

In recognition of the need for a comprehensive, balanced approach to Bay Area transportation needs, the State Legislature established the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission (BATSC) in 1963. The Commission was given responsibility to develop a comprehensive transportation plan and recommend ways to implement the plan, including an organizational approach to the transition from the interim study commission to an on-going program.

The major organizational recommendation of this study was the establishment of a regional transportation agency. The rationale for such an agency was based on

the need to pursue a comprehensive and regional approach to Bay Area transportation planning. The study pointed out the existence of the multitude of transit operators and jurisdictions, each incapable of adopting a truly regional and comprehensive transportation approach. The preferred approach to regional organization was similar to that recommended in the San Francisco Bay Plan; namely, that regional transportation coordination be the responsibility of a "Transportation Department" of a Bay Area regional organization. The BATSC report further recommended that BART be made a division of the regional transportation agency. This recommendation, however, was not accepted. Instead, the alternative of a "Metropolitan Transportation Agency" was adopted.

According to key informants interviewed, BART represented one of several aspects of the Bay Area transportation situation that pointed up the need for regional coordination. It was agreed, however, that with or without BART, there was a need as well as support for a regional transportation agency. Some key informants conceded that BART may have acted as a catalyst in accelerating the formation of MTC, but maintained that BART itself was not the critical reason behind formation of MTC.

(2) The MTC Organization Structure Reflects MTC's Evolution From Principally A Planning Orientation To A Project Development And Operations Performance Orientation

In its brief seven year history, MTC has exercised a powerful role in Bay Area transportation policy. In successive legislative actions, MTC was created, then granted responsibilities related to transportation planning and funding including:

- . Serving as the regional transportation planning agency and submitting and revising the Regional Transportation Plan.
- . Reviewing claims by local jurisdictions for the major portion of Transportation Development Act (TDA) sales tax revenues earmarked for mass transit (the State Legislature delegated this authority to MTC rather than CALTRANS for the nine Bay Area counties).

- . Reviewing applications by local jurisdictions for State and Federal funds.
- . Adopting rate schedules for State-owned toll bridges in the San Francisco Bay Area and utilizing the net revenues for the development of transportation projects in the vicinity of the toll bridges.

MTC policy is set by a 16 member commission, comprised of appointed representatives from each jurisdiction in the nine county Bay Area. Nine of the sixteen current Commissioners are either elected city council members or county supervisors. Commission policy is carried out by a 90 member staff led by an executive director.


Recent changes (May, 1977) in how the MTC staff is organized have resulted in the organization structure depicted on Exhibit IV. The organization structure reflects the two major functions performed by MTC: planning of transportation systems and coordinating the development and implementation of transportation programs. Prior to adopting this structure, the MTC organization was more oriented to research and planning.

(3) BART Has Had Some Impact On The Function And Staffing Of MTC In Its Early Stages

Although MTC was created by the Legislature in 1970, no funds were initially appropriated. Some funds remaining from the BATSC study were used to hire an Executive Director. The Executive Director then, in cooperation with the BART management, developed proposals for 11 studies of BART extensions beyond its planned system limits. These studies were placed under the supervision of Joint Boards of Control. The study project management had representatives from MTC and BART, as well as local communities involved. These studies were funded by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) and provided MTC with its first opportunity to acquire a professional staff.

In addition to the BART extension studies, the Federal Government funded other studies related to BART, such as the study to coordinate transfers between BART, AC Transit and San Francisco's MUNI systems. In the opinions of key informants interviewed, the funding of BART-related projects undertaken by MTC was critical in the development of MTC's capability to carry out its other assigned tasks.

Public Policy Project
CURRENT ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION *



*As of 6/77

The BART Impact Program, funded by the Federal Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development beginning in 1974, was designed to determine the impacts of BART on the Bay Area. This program is separately staffed and funded, but shares administrative support services with MTC. Funding of the BART Impact Program did enable MTC to gain additional administrative support services to the extent the BART Impact Program shared in the costs and benefits of that support.

(4) BART Has Also Had A Noticeable Effect On The Orientation And Operations Of MTC

BART's status as the only true regional mass transit system results in substantial MTC liaison and review functions related to BART. In the view of key informants interviewed, BART-related issues have comprised a major focus of MTC staff activities. Such activities concern:

- . Allocation of TDA funds (BART receives 30% of TDA funds in the BART counties).
- . BART feeder service coordination.
- . Development and revision of the Regional Transportation Plan.

This interaction, although complex and demanding, has not resulted in an organizational subdivision that focuses exclusively on rapid transit. As shown on Exhibit IV, MTC is organized on a broad functional basis. Within these broad functions, there are no staff members exclusively assigned to liaison relationships with BART.

Further, legislative concern over BART's management problems has likely accelerated a shift in MTC from a planning orientation to a programming and performance evaluation orientation. The evolution of the MTC organization has paralleled in important ways the transition BART has had to make from a planning and construction orientation to an operations and maintenance orientation. In the view of one key informant, legislative preoccupation with BART's management and operating problems was in large part responsible for the recently enacted legislation requiring that MTC establish performance criteria, and monitor operators' performance in connection with the allocation of Transportation Development Act funds. The fact that performance audit requirements were attached to a request for BART permanent funding further substantiates the

relationship of these provisions to BART. The current project and operations-oriented organization structure was recently set up to respond to the shift in MTC focus from planning to operations. Consequently, to the extent the Legislature was responding to BART, BART has directly impacted both the organization structure and activity focus of MTC.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this study was to identify changes in the structure, organization and operations of local, regional and state governmental units and to determine the relationship of these changes to BART planning, organization and operations. This chapter presents the conclusions of this analysis, outlined for each of the three major study areas: municipal incorporation, local governments and community groups, and regional and state governments. These conclusions are followed by a discussion of the transferability of study findings and public policy implications.

The overall conclusion of this study is that BART has had little or no impact on organizational arrangements and practices in either local, regional or state governments and agencies. Further, where BART issues did require the attention of one of these levels of government, such issues were handled within the existing organizational structures and channels or within generally accepted informal arrangements (such as an inter-departmental committee). General reasons for this lack of response are:

- . Local governments viewed BART as an issue, not an opportunity. Local officials viewed BART as a regional issue requiring a regional, not local response. When BART-related issues were considered on the local level, the issues were generally raised by the BART staff and some agreement usually had to be reached before BART planning or construction would proceed. Only in a few isolated cases did cities view BART as an opportunity and possible means to achieve some other local objectives.
- . Particularly in smaller cities, BART issues could be readily handled through existing organizational channels and arrangements. BART-related issues in these communities were generally straight-forward and not controversial as well as few in number. For example, the City of Richmond established a BART liaison position and found the incumbent could not be kept busy full-time solely on BART issues.
- . Organizational charters and bureaucratic structures have generally evolved over long periods of time and are difficult to change. BART alone was not a sufficiently compelling issue to re-orient long established bureaucratic structures, particularly in older cities.

- . In a region with such strong local government identity, BART alone was not a compelling reason to create strong regional structures to regulate BART-related issues alone. The formation of new regional and state agencies was a response to long standing regional problems and needs, not just the introduction of a rapid transit system like BART.

The following three sections present more specific conclusions in each of the three project study areas.

1. BART WAS, AT MOST, AN INDIRECT CAUSE FOR RECENT MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION ATTEMPTS

An examination of the background of seven recent municipal incorporation attempts in the BART counties led to the conclusion that BART was not a direct cause for the initiation of any incorporation attempt. Where BART was expected to cause substantial development and growth in an area, and the management of growth was a strong incorporation issue, then BART may have had an indirect relationship. This argument might be applied in the case of Pleasant Hill, Moraga, San Ramon Valley, Orinda and Lafayette only. However, BART was never a focus of the attempts to incorporate, nor was it ever defined as one of the causes during hearings before the LAFCO.

Our analysis of the municipal incorporation process indicates that a community must possess three essential ingredients before incorporation can be effectively implemented:

- . Common identity--either geographical, economic or institutional.
- . Sufficient resources--adequate tax base for necessary public services without requiring substantial increases in taxes.
- . Common needs--for example, a desire for more comprehensive localized planning.

Since BART was viewed as an issue, not an opportunity, it could not contribute to any of these three ingredients in any significant way and, therefore, could not be a significant cause for attempting incorporation.

Further, even if BART was a factor in a decision to incorporate, all of the proposed incorporations were attempted and/or implemented too late to have any impact on the major development-related BART decisions--station location and route alignment. Therefore, if incorporation was viewed as a way to increase local control over BART-related land use policy decisions, the late timing would not have allowed this objective to be achieved.

2. BART HAD LITTLE OR NO EFFECT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY GROUP ORGANIZATION OR OPERATIONS

The planning and construction of BART and the organization of BART resulted in a number of significant impacts in many Bay Area communities. However, only in a few cases did local governments or community groups actually change their organizational structure or operating practices in response to BART impacts. The following sections present conclusions about BART's organizational impacts by type of organization.

City Governments

- The size of the city and the level of BART impact were the primary factors in determining the level of organizational change to be expected. For example, the larger case study cities with multiple BART stations expecting significant construction disruption created some new organizational structures to respond to BART. Correspondingly, smaller case study cities with a single BART station expecting limited impacts usually responded to BART through existing organizational channels.
- Experience in the case study cities generally confirmed original expectations of limited organizational changes in response to BART. Although some change was apparent, it was temporary, followed standard city organizational practices or involved merely staff additions to existing organizations, rather than structural change.
- Although the case study cities do not represent diverse types of local government structures, these small differences lead to some general conclusions. San Francisco's hybrid form of weak mayor/chief administrative officer form of government lacks accountability by nature of its organizational structure. Although San Francisco experiences the most substantial organizational changes of all case study cities, the changes still did not provide the level of coordination to ensure timely effective BART-related decisions.

. County Governments

- One decision-maker was interviewed in each of Alameda and Contra Costa Counties to identify any apparent organizational changes in response to BART. Neither official could identify any such changes in county organization and operations. Although this sample and response is inconclusive, it does indicate that if changes did exist, they must have been small or imperceptible.

. Private Organizations

- Corporate and business leaders generally organized or worked through existing organizations to promote and take advantage of BART. Business leaders were most active during BART's early planning stages and became more remote as basic decisions were made and construction began.
- Merchants and local property owners were generally more cautious than business and corporate leaders. These individuals were uncertain about BART's potential and formed groups to protect themselves from BART's adverse impacts. In some cases, they mobilized to obtain some amenities from BART, but the expectations were short rather than long term.

. Community Groups

- Grass roots community organizations were formed or responded to BART to oppose what were perceived as BART's adverse impacts on neighborhoods.

3. BART WAS ONE OF MANY CAUSES FOR THE FORMATION OF NEW REGIONAL AND STATE AGENCIES

BART, as a regional organization, as well as an innovative regional transportation system, appears to have had some direct and indirect organization impacts on State and regional agencies. It is, however, difficult to really establish BART as a prime causal factor in the minds of any of the key informants interviewed on this task. However, there are several likely conclusions as to the impact of BART on the formation and organization of BCDC, CALTRANS, and MTC:

- . The BART response to transportation needs was paralleled by, but did not in any way cause or indirectly influence the organization structure of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission.
- . BART, to the extent it influenced Federal policy formulation, and the timing and activity focus of MTC, had substantive yet indirect impact upon the formation of CALTRANS and the nature and scope of CALTRANS San Francisco office activities.
- . BART acted as a primary influence with respect to regional transportation by:
 - Possibly accelerating the timing of MTC's establishment by increasing public awareness of mass transportation issues.
 - Providing a basis for Federal funding for BART-related projects during the early formative stages of MTC.
 - Causing a shift in emphasis at MTC from planning to operations performance evaluation.

4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

BART's lack of any significant organizational impact leads to a number of important policy implications for other areas contemplating rapid rail system development. However, other jurisdictions must keep in mind the unique structure of the Bay Area for handling governmental and public policy issues. As noted earlier, the Bay Area (and California in general) can be characterized by strong local government organizations, where rigid city and county charters tend to mandate largely unalterable bureaucratic structures. Further, regional government entities are only a recent addition to the Bay Area governmental arena--many have been formed in response to specific regional issues (e.g. transportation, environmental quality, land use, etc) but they appear to be reasonably weak and generally uncoordinated. Overall, the governmental structure in the region is fragmented, thereby increasing the requirements of any agency such as BART in coordinating local response to system planning and development. The BART findings are generally applicable to other jurisdictions having a similar type of regional organizational arrangement.

(1) Implications For The Overall Regional Organization Context

The BART findings provide a number of useful lessons about the overall organization of a region and how governing bodies interact with rapid rail transit systems.

- . Governmental officials should not expect the formation of a new regional transit district and resulting transit development to cause any change in other governmental structures.

The BART experience clearly points out that rapid rail transit planning, construction and operations will not alone cause any local, regional, state or community organizations to alter their existing structure and operations in any significant way. Even the formation of the BART District as the first truly regional transit district did not directly cause any alterations in existing arrangements.

- . Local, regional and state agencies will probably not benefit by altering existing organizational arrangements in any significant way, just to respond to rapid rail transit development.

An analysis of the BART experience suggests that any significant change in organization would be costly and would probably not result in significant benefits to the affected organizations. Implementation of significant organizational change in well-established bureaucratic organizations such as exist in the Bay Area would probably result in significant costs in political effectiveness and personnel morale. It is also doubtful, once changes are made, that rapid rail transit-related decisions would really be made more effectively.

- . If regional governmental structures are generally fragmented, as in the Bay Area, rapid rail transit officials should plan on significant time delay and cost increases before system construction can begin.

BART officials significantly underestimated the amount of time and cost in reaching necessary agreements with a host of local jurisdictions prior to system construction. In most cases, local governments could delay rapid rail transit, while bargaining for amenities, by not approving permits needed by the rapid transit district to begin construction on the public rights-of-way. Without

the existence of a strong regional organization with some veto over local officials, a rapid rail transit organization has no alternative but to negotiate individual agreements with each local jurisdiction. Transit officials, knowing this requirement, should incorporate adequate time and funding in the initial system plans.

(2) Implications For Municipal Incorporation

The planning and development of a rapid rail transit system will probably not provide sufficient reason for any communities to attempt incorporation. Based on the experience in the Bay Area, a community could probably not raise sufficient support for incorporation based solely on the perceived expectations of rapid rail transit-related development and growth.

Alternatively, it is unlikely that a municipal incorporation would have a significant impact on the development of a rapid rail transit system. At least in California, the municipal incorporation process is time consuming and complex. Even if incorporation could be achieved it might be too late to have any significant effect on rapid rail system planning and development or related land use policy. Potentially, incorporation could have three benefits:

- . Increase local control over station location and route alignment decisions.
- . Increase the likelihood of local land use policy changes as a means to meet local land use and development objectives.
- . Increase local control over rapid rail access planning.

If these three benefits are to be realized, however, incorporation must be achieved early in the rapid transit system planning process. Even then, local time and effort will probably be better spent working through existing planning arrangements to achieve these benefits rather than attempting incorporation.

(3) Implications For Local Government Organization

The BART experience suggests that rapid rail transit development is not likely to cause any noticeable changes in local government organization and operations. Local governments will have to deal with rapid transit-related issues only if the new system enters its existing rights-of-way or property. Local officials can probably simplify any required interaction in the following ways:

- . Select a staff member(s) to serve as liaison to the rapid transit district to coordinate planning and construction activities. To be effective, the liaison must have access to and the support of key local decision-makers. The purpose of the liaison should be to facilitate regular city processes and operations rather than establish alternative decision mechanisms. As shown in the San Francisco experience, a liaison can serve as a bottleneck rather than a facilitator. Therefore, the existence of the liaison should not be designed to restrict normal contact with other city organizations.
- . An inter-departmental committee structure provided some improvements in the decision process in San Francisco and Oakland. However, such an arrangement should be used as an extension, not a replacement to regular city decision-making processes. Such a committee provides a useful forum for discussing issues from varying points of view but implementation will generally suffer if left strictly to the committee.

Although a rapid transit system may not directly cause or require any local government organization changes, local governments may be interested in considering changes that might enhance their ability to take advantage of rapid rail transit development. In general, the experience of communities in the BART counties suggests that any major changes in organization structure and/or staffing will probably not provide significant benefits. The political and morale costs of any dramatic organization change or significant increases in staff will probably outweigh the potential benefits in coordination and responsiveness.


(4) Implications For Regional And State Government Organization

Based on the experience in the Bay Area, the development of a regional rapid rail transit system will probably only affect regional and state agencies with a transportation planning mission. Consequently, a regional transportation or planning agency should consider staffing and organizing in anticipation of rapid transit system development. Examples of activities which would be usefully performed by a regional transportation planning body include:

- . Integration of rapid transit planning in total transportation system planning, particularly the coordination of feeder service and rapid transit.
- . Review of construction project management activities.
- . Operations performance evaluation.
- . Establishment of a fair and impartial criterion for the allocation of transportation funds.

Although specific organization approaches will undoubtedly differ, each of the above areas will very likely represent the significant points of interaction between a regional transportation planning agency and an independent transportation authority.


ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ORGANIZATION




Appointed Commissions

San Francisco--The combined City and County operates using a unique hybrid form of government with administrative power fragmented among an elected weak Mayor, an appointed Chief Administrative officer and a variety of independent commissions appointed by the Mayor. The Board of Supervisors is the City's legislative body, elected by district for the first time in 1977. The board has little direct authority and is barred by charter from interfering in administrative affairs of City departments.


Public Policy Project
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
CITY OF OAKLAND ORGANIZATION



Oakland--This city is organized under the Council/Manager form of government. A part-time Mayor and Council are elected to four year terms of office. The Mayor has several special responsibilities over that of individual council members.


Public Policy Project
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
CITY OF RICHMOND ORGANIZATION

Richmond--The City operates with the Council/Manager form of government. Nine council members are elected for six year terms. The Mayor is selected from among the Council members for a one year term. The City Manager is responsible to the Council.



Walnut Creek--The City is organized under the Council/Manager form of government. Members of the part-time Council are elected at large. The Mayor is elected by the Council and serves primarily in a ceremonial role. A City Clerk and a Treasurer are also elected by the people.

APPENDIX A-5
Public Policy Project
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
CITY OF FREMONT ORGANIZATION



Fremont--The City is another example of the Council/Manager form of government. A part-time Council of five members (including the Mayor) is elected at large. The Mayor is elected separately by the people and holds some responsibilities in addition to those of a council member.

ABBENDIX B
Public Policy Project
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW LIST

I. MUNICIPAL INCORPORATIONS

JOSEPH CONNERY	Executive Director, LAFCo., Contra Costa County.
MICHAEL CORY	Mayor of Moraga.
ROBERT MERRIT	Moraga resident.
NORM ROBERTS	San Ramon Valley resident.
GORDON SOARES	Moraga resident.

II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONSSAN FRANCISCO

JOHN ANDERSON	Former Mayor's Assistant Director for Development, and consultant to three San Francisco mayors.
BERNARD AVERBUSH	Director, Market Street Development Project.
JACK BARRON	Project Manager, Transit Task Force, City of San Francisco.
LINDA FERBERT	Former Mission Liaison, Department of City Planning
RICHARD HARCOURT	Former Director of Transportation, San Francisco Chamber of Commerce.
ALLAN JACOBS	Former Director of City Planning, San Francisco.
JOHN JACOBS	Executive Director, San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association.
TOBY LEVINE	Mission Planning Council.
JAMES MCCARTHY	Former Director of City Planning, San Francisco.
THOMAS MELLON	Former Chief Administrative Officer, City of San Francisco.
ORAL MOORE	Director, Hetch Hetchy, former member Technical Advisory Committee, City of San Francisco.
RONALD PELOSI	Member, Board of Supervisors, former member City Planning Commission.
WALTER STOLL	Former Director of Transportation Planning, Department of City Planning, San Francisco.

OAKLAND

TED BURTON	Rockridge Community Planning Council.
JOHN HOULIHAN	Former Mayor of Oakland.
WARREN ISSAC	Executive Director, Oakland Downtown Merchants Association.
NORM LIND	Director of Planning, City of Oakland.
JOHN READING	Former Mayor of Oakland
CECIL RILEY	City Manager, City of Oakland.

RICHMOND

PAT JONES	Richmond Community Development.
AL WHITE	Former City Engineer, Richmond (retired).
CHARLES WOODWARD	Planning Director, Richmond.

WALNUT CREEK

DAN SMITH	Former Traffic Engineer, Walnut Creek.
RALPH SNIDER	Former Manager, Walnut Creek.

FREMONT

DONALD DILLON	Former Mayor and City Council member.
MYRON HARMON	Traffic Engineer.

BART

HARRY MOSES	BART Governmental Relations Staff (Retired).
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CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

JAMES KENNEY

Member, Board of Supervisors.

ROBERT SCHRODER

Member, Board of Supervisors.

ALAMEDA COUNTY

JOSEPH P. BORT

Member, Board of Supervisors.

III. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

GEORGE REED	Senior Planner.
CHARLES ROBERTS	Executive Director.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BURCH BACHTOLD	Deputy Director, District IV Office.
LAWRENCE DAHMS	Director, Planning and Programming.
GENE HARDIN	Deputy Director, District IV Office.
TOM LAMMERS	Chief, District IV Office.
HARRY PARRISH	Chief, Division of Mass Transit, Transportation Planning and Programming.

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

PAUL BAY	Deputy Director for Planning and Environmental Analysis.
NAT GAGE	Director, Program Development and Implementation.
GORDON SHUNK	Program Manager, BART Impact Program.
PAUL WATT	Executive Director.

APPENDIX C
DOCUMENT REFERENCE LIST
ORGANIZATION

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